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1 Introduction
Product quality is one of the most important strategic variables of a firm operating in an im-
perfectly competitive market. The quality choice is the outcome of a trade-off between the
cost of an incremental quality provision and a ceteris paribus higher demand for a superior
product. Higher quality allows the growth potential of the market to be captured, whereas
lower quality often enables the firm to reduce potential losses in bad states of demand. For
example, the options available to the subscribers of a Japanese operator NTT DoCoMo via
the i-mode and related third generation (3G) services in the first stage of their implementation
were scaled down compared to initial plans. This was due to the fact that demand, in relation
to the associated costs, turned out to be lower than expected. At the time of launching the
new product, the subscribers were not able to videoconference or receive video clips, and
what remained in the package offered to them was accessing e-mail, downloading news and
weather reports, and calling up location-specific information. Adding new services was post-
poned until the demand was sufficiently high. Also, looming competitive entries of KDDI
and, subsequently, Vodafone undoubtedly influenced both the timing and quality decisions
of the incumbent.1
The last two decades have yielded a number of contributions concerning the quality
choice of firms. Motta (1993) analyzes the magnitude of vertical differentiation under
Bertrand and Cournot competition, whereas Aoki and Prusa (1996) and Lehmann-Grube
(1997) show that the firm providing higher quality earns a higher profit. Foros and Hansen
(2002) incorporate network externalities, Hoppe and Lehmann-Grube (2001) show the ex-
istence of a second-mover advantage, while Dubey and Wu (2002) observe an inverted U-
shaped relationship between the number of firms and quality provision. More recently, Lam-
bertini and Tedeschi (2007) obtain that the leader achieves higher profit by offering a lower
quality product. These contributions constitute a static approach to the problem of optimal
1See The Economist, October 13th, 2001, ’The Mobile Internet: A Survey’ and Nov 16th, 2004, ’Geeing up
3G’.
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quality provision under imperfect competition.
A changing economic environment results in firms maximizing their values not only by
selecting product characteristics, such as quality, but also by choosing the timing of a product
launch. By definition, this timing aspect is not taken into account by the existing static mod-
els.2 Moreover, given the fact that entry is (at least partially) irreversible, both quality and
timing are also likely to be dependent on the magnitude of economic uncertainty. To incor-
porate market dynamics and the underlying uncertainty, we build upon the literature of real
option games, which deals with uncertain irreversible investment in the presence of strate-
gic interactions in product markets. A far from complete list of references includes Smets
(1991), Grenadier (1996, 2000), Huisman (2001), Hoppe (2002), Lambrecht and Perraudin
(2003), and Mason and Weeds (2005).
To study the quality choice and timing decision we employ a simple duopoly model in
which the firms’ products are imperfect substitutes. Horizontal differentiation results from
the fact that some of the products’ features cannot be directly compared in terms of their
contribution to the consumers’ utility. For example, Internet Service Providers operating
via a cable TV will have different features than the ones using a telephone connection. A
similar difference exists between wireless and cable telecommunication services (cf. Foros
and Hansen (2002) for a discussion). We show that, in general, the follower firm supplies a
higher quality. This result contradicts some of the past contributions (cf. Motta (1993), Aoki
and Prusa (1996), and Lehmann-Grube (1997)) and is supported by an anecdotal historical
evidence (see, for example, the cases of Edison and Westinghouse in the electricity genera-
tion, De Havilland Comet and Boeing 707 in the commercial jet aircraft, and VisiCalc and
Lotus 1-2-3 in the spreadsheet markets, in which a pioneering firm offered an inferior quality
and lost a considerable part of the market share to the second entrant). Such quality choices
indicate the trade-off that firms potentially face in the dynamic case: the leader will operate
2The notable exceptions are Hoppe and Lehmann-Grube (2001) and Pennings (2004), who model the qual-
ity choice as a (deterministic and stochastic, respectively) timing game.
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for a longer period but it is the follower who will have the ultimate quality advantage.
Finally, we also consider a situation in which the pioneering firm has the ability to con-
tinuously adjust quality. In order to determine the additional value of flexibility in quality
choice, we compare the case of flexible quality to the fixed quality technology. Flexible qual-
ity is associated with the presence of sufficient know-how within the firm, the use of a more
advanced technology or contractual flexibility (e.g. via a flexible agreement with content
providers in the case of a 3G mobile operator).
As mentioned before, if the fixed quality technology is used, the quality chosen by the
leader is lower than that of the follower. This is due to the fact that it invests at a lower
level of consumer demand, which, in turn, implies a lower marginal return on investment in
quality.
We also show that both under fixed and flexible quality cases, the follower can drive the
pioneering firm out of the market. This is caused by the fact that the follower invests when
demand is high, which implies a higher optimal quality provision. This effect is stronger for
the leader’s flexible quality. In this case, the leader is not able commit to the initial quality
level, which makes it less costly for the follower to become a monopolist in the market.
Using a different set-up, Pennings (2004) also employs a real option approach to analyze
the optimal quality choice. However, his framework is restricted to perfect substitutes and a
fixed quality choice. One of Pennings’ main results confirms ours in the sense that under high
uncertainty the follower will wait and enter the market later with a higher quality product.
Still, he obtains that under low uncertainty the leader offers the higher quality product, which
contradicts our result in the fixed quality framework. The latter result follows from the fact
that the present value of the monopolistic profit would be insufficient to compensate for the
disadvantage of having to compete with a lower quality good after the followers’ entry when
demand is fairly predictable.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the setup of the general model.
In Section 3 the game with a fixed quality technology is considered. The analysis of a flexible
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quality choice is presented in Section 4. Section 5 concludes. Proofs and derivations are
included in the appendix.
2 The Model
Consider a situation in which a firm (Firm 1) has an investment opportunity to launch a new
product (or a service) in an uncertain market. It chooses the optimal timing of investment and
the quality of the product taking into account the possibility of entry of another firm (Firm
2). Denote the degree of substitution between the firms’ products by ρ ∈ (0,1). Parameter ρ
is assumed to be exogenous. For ρ close to unity, the products are close substitutes, whereas
ρ equal to zero is equivalent to Firms 1 and 2 operating in separate markets.
All consumers are identical and share the following utility function (cf. Singh and Vives
(1984) and Ha¨ckner (2000), see also Dixit (1979)):
U(n1,n2) = q1n1 +q2n2− 12
(
γ1n21 +2ρn1n2 + γ2n22
)
, (1)
where qi is the quality of good i, i ∈ {1,2}, ni is its quantity per consumer and γ1, γ2 are
constants. Following Ha¨ckner (2000), it is assumed that γ1 = γ2 = 1.3 Consumers maximize
U(n1,n2)− p1n1− p2n2, where pi is the unit price of good i. This maximization problem
results in demand functions
pi = qi−ni−ρn j for i, j ∈ {1,2} and i = j. (3)
3A possible introduction of network externalities would translate into multiplying the third component of
(1) by (1−a), where a reflects the intensity of network externalities. The demand function can in such a case
be written as
pi = qi−ni−ρn j +a(ni +ρn j) . (2)
The interpretation of network externalities is restricted by the model specification here and is related to the
quantity of the goods consumed by a single consumer. However, it is unrelated to the total mass of consumers,
which enters the model in a multiplicative way.
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The cost of delivering one unit of output equals ci. Then, the (instantaneous) profit per









where θ is an indicator function equal to 1 for Betrand competition and 0 if firms compete a`
la Cournot (cf. Singh and Vives (1984)). Unless the following set of inequalities is satisfied
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one of the firms does not generate a positive profit and leaves the market. Throughout the
analysis, we assume that the leader-follower roles of the firms are predetermined so that Firm
2 can only enter after Firm 1 has already done so. The quality selected by the follower (Firm
2) can be obtained analytically (by directly maximizing its value function). The fixed quality
choice of the leader (Firm 1) takes into account the expected time it operates as a monopolist
and as a duopolist, and is obtained numerically. Once the quality is selected, it cannot be
changed. (Later, we discuss the implications of the possibility of the leader to change the
quality level at the moment the follower enters.)
The uncertainty in the model is incorporated by allowing the number of (identical) con-
sumers at time t, xt , to follow a geometric Brownian motion (cf. Pennings (2004)):
dxt = αxdt +σxdwt . (7)
Here α denotes the deterministic drift rate and σ is the instantaneous volatility of the process.
In the remainder of the paper xt is used as a variable reflecting the underlying economic un-
certainty. The initial realization of the process xt , denoted by x0, is assumed to be sufficiently
low which means that the market is too small for an immediate entry to be optimal. Both
firms are risk neutral and the riskless interest rate is r.
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To enter the market, Firm i ∈ {1,2} has to incur a sunk investment cost I(qi) > 0. The
cost of quality provision is defined as
I (qi) = I0qεi , (8)
where I0 > 0 can be interpreted as an efficiency parameter (so higher values of I0 cor-
respond to a lower efficiency in R&D). The elasticity parameter ε is assumed to satisfy
ε > 2β/(β−1), where β is defined in Appendix B (see (B.5)). Otherwise, the marginal net
benefit of increasing quality is positive for all quality levels. The decision of Firm i is to
choose the optimal quality, q∗i , and the timing of entry, x∗i , in order to maximize the value of
its investment opportunity, given the strategy selected by the competitor.
3 Fixed Quality
In this section we assume that a once chosen quality cannot be changed. The idea of a
fixed quality choice is therefore similar to Ueng (1997), who considers an infinitely repeated
oligopoly game in which the qualities are chosen before the first period. A fixed quality
typically occurs when the production technology is provided by an external vendor, or when
the firm’s R&D department is of a relatively small size.
The game is solved backwards in time. First, Firm 2’s reaction function, consisting of
its entry threshold and quality choice, is determined. Subsequently, given Firm 2’s reaction
function, the optimal strategy of Firm 1 is derived. Define T2 as the (random) time at which xt
hits Firm 2’s optimal entry threshold for the first time. Then the value of Firm 2’s investment










where q1 is the quality selected by Firm 1. The value of Firm 2’s investment opportunity
equals the present value of its profits net of investment cost, maximized with respect to
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the quality and the timing of entry. Using standard dynamic programming techniques (see







From (10) it can be concluded that Firm 2 invests at the Marshallian trigger multiplied by
the mark-up β/(β−1)> 1. This mark-up, reflecting revenue uncertainty and irreversibility
of entry, is positively related to σ and α, and negatively related to r.










which corresponds to the product of the projects’ net present value at the time of entry and
the stochastic discount factor corresponding to the moment of xt hitting x∗2 for the first time.4
Substituting (10) into (11), and calculating the first-order condition yields the equation for
the optimal quality of Firm 2:5
βπ′2(q2,q1)I(q2)− (β−1)π2(q2,q1)I′(q2) = 0. (12)
Using (4), we subsequently obtain





Δ is defined by (6) and ξ is an indicator function equal 1 if Firm 1 stays in the market
following the entry of Firm 2 and 0 otherwise. From (13) it is obtained that as long as Firm
1 stays in the market following the entry of Firm 2, q2 is a strategic complement of q1, so the
quality chosen by Firm 2 is positively related to the quality choice made by Firm 1.






β (see, e.g., Dixit and Pindyck (1994)).
5The second-order condition of (11) is satisfied at q ∗2.
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The complete characterization of Firm 2’s reaction function to the quality choice of Firm
1 requires considering an additional case, in which q2 is not chosen according to the first-
order condition (12). This additional case corresponds to the lowest quality level that can
induce the exit of Firm 1. In fact, Firm 2 may find it optimal to set the quality level just
marginally above the level at which Firm 1 will be indifferent between staying and leav-
ing the market (that is, the instantaneous profit of Firm 1 at that level will equal 0.). This
”strategic” monopolistic quality level of Firm 2 is lower than the optimal duopolistic level
but higher than the unconstrained monopolistic one. The three quality regimes of Firm 2 are
described in the following proposition.




c2Γ for q1 < q′1,
c2 +
q1−c1
Δ for q1 ∈ [q′1,q′′1),
c2Γ+ξ(q1− c1)ΓΔ for q1 ≥ q′′1 ,
(15)
where
q′1 = c1 + c2(Γ−1)Δ, and (16)
q′′1 = c1 + c2(Γ−1)
Δ
1−ΓΔ2 . (17)
Regime q1 < q′1 corresponds to a(n) (unconstrained) monopoly of Firm 2 following its en-
try, whereas for q1 ≥ q′′1 a duopoly is the prevailing market structure. For q1 ∈ [q′1,q′′1) a
monopolistic outcome occurs following the strategic quality choice by Firm 2.
Proof. See Appendix A.
From Proposition 1 it follows that q∗2 is a piecewise linear function of q1 (see Figure 1).
Quality level q∗2 (weakly) increases with parameter Γ, which can be associated with good
investment conditions (it is positively related to the market growth rate, α, and volatility, σ,
and negatively to the discount rate, r, and the exponent of the cost function, ε). In the second
regime, q∗2 is negatively related to parameter Δ, which positively depends both on Bertrand
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competition indicator, θ, as well as on the level of the products’ substitutability, ρ. This
negative relationship can be explained by the fact that for its given quality choice, Firm 1 is
less likely to remain in the market which is more competitive (Bertrand competition com-
bined with high substitutability of firms’ products). Finally, in the duopolistic outcome, for a
given quality of Firm 1, the quality selected by Firm 2 is higher under Bertrand competition
than in the Cournot framework, and when goods offered by firms are closer substitutes (as
∂q∗2/∂Δ> 0 in this case). Furthermore, if ΓΔ2 ≥ 1, that is, when good investment conditions
are combined with firms being close competitors, duopoly never prevails following the entry
of Firm 2.
[Please insert Figure 1 about here]
To describe the optimal reaction of Firm 2 to the changes in the quality level of Firm 1,
we formulate the following proposition.
Proposition 2 Firm 2 responds optimally to an increased quality of Firm 1 not only by rais-








Proof. See Appendix A.
The choice of a higher quality level by Firm 1 results therefore in a higher cost of entry
of Firm 2, due to its higher optimal response q∗2. Moreover, it induces a later entry of Firm 2.
Having determined the reaction function (the optimal quality and the resulting entry
threshold) of Firm 2, we are in a position to analyze the decision of Firm 1. First, we note
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Working out the expectations yields





















Value lost due to the competitive entry
⎫⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎭ , (21)
where πi (qi) is defined as a special case of (4) with ρ = 0 (monopolistic market). Equation
(21) implies that as soon as competitive entry becomes very remote, that is, when x∗2 → ∞,
the value of the investment opportunity reduces to the valuation of a monopolistic firm.








The optimal investment timing of Firm 1 does not explicitly depend on the choices made
by Firm 2 regarding its timing of entry and quality. This outcome results from the fact that
the roles of the firms (leader and follower) are pre-determined.6 However, the outcome of
our model still differs from the standard result from the real options theory concerning the
irrelevance of the follower’s timing of entry for the decision of the leader. The reason is that
Firm 1’s timing decision is affected by its own choice of quality, q1, which, in turn, depends
on Firm 2’s both entry threshold and quality choice.
The resulting dependence of Firm 1’s investment threshold on the behavior of Firm 2 is
therefore caused by the fact that Firm 1 has two decision variables (the timing of entry and
quality) as opposed to a single variable in standard real option models. As competitive entry
6If the roles of the firms are pre-determined, the optimal timing of the leader equals the one of a monopolistic
firm in a standard real-option game (see, e.g., Reinganum (1981) and Huisman (2001), p. 170).
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changes the optimal quality choice q∗1 (which is no longer equal to that of an uncontested
monopolist), the monopolistic timing of entry is, in general, not optimal either.
The value of the investment opportunity is determined by maximizing the RHS of (21).
The derivative of F1 with respect to q1 can be easily computed since x∗1,x∗2 and q∗2 are known
functions of q1. However, due to the non-linearity of the resulting relationship, the root of
the derivative is determined numerically.
Numerical calculations (based on maximizing the value of the investment opportunity
of Firm 1) indicate that the presence of a potential competitor tends to increase the quality
provision of Firm 1 for low levels of uncertainty, σ, and to reduce it in the opposite case (see
Table 1). Higher (lower) quality q1 results, in turn, in the optimal entry threshold of Firm 1
being higher (lower) than the monopolistic counterpart.
Moreover, our simulations show that the quality provision of Firm 1 increases with the
quality of its competitor. In particular, this can be seen under those scenarios in which Firm 2
selects the quality level that results in the exit of Firm 1 (REGk = MS or M in Table 1). This
finding, together with Proposition 2, implies that firms’ qualities are strategic complements.
[Please insert Table 1 about here]
From a consumer surplus perspective, industry concentration has two opposing effects.
First, it increases the provision of (average) quality, which benefits consumers. Second, it
can delay investment of the pioneering firm (Firm 1) so the utility derived by the consumers
has to be discounted more heavily. Therefore, the overall impact of industry concentration
on consumer surplus is ambiguous.
Higher demand uncertainty generally leads to a higher quality provision. This result,
consistent with Pennings (2004), is due to the convexity of the value of the firm’s investment
opportunity in the underlying stochastic variable. This convexity implies a higher optimal
level of investment in quality (cf. Bar-Ilan and Strange (1999), who obtain a positive rela-
tionship between uncertainty and the optimal scale of investment). Moreover, the dispersion
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of the firms’ quality levels is an increasing function of uncertainty. However, the positive
relationship may not hold if higher uncertainty leads to a different market regime following
Firm 2’s entry (in particular, a monopoly – as monopolistic quantities are generally lower
than duopolistic ones).
As qualities are strategic complements, q1 is generally higher under Bertrand competition
and for horizontally less differentiated products. Our numerical simulations also indicate that
the follower’s quality is higher than that of the leader. In fact, for the cost parameters being
equal across the firms, the sufficient condition for the follower’s quality to be always higher
is
ΓΔ> 1. (23)
Inequality (23) implies that the follower’s quality exceeds that of the leader for sufficiently
small cost elasticity parameter ε, sufficiently large market uncertainty (captured by the re-
ciprocal of β) and for a low degree of product (horizontal) differentiation. In general, this
relationship is due to the fact that the follower invests later than the leader (that is, at a larger
market size – captured by x) and its marginal return on investment in quality is higher.
Upon analyzing Table 1 it can be concluded that the relative gap between Firm 1’s and
Firm 2’s entry thresholds widens with uncertainty. This implies that higher uncertainty ham-
pers competition in the sense of the follower optimally having to wait for a higher level of
demand before committing to entry.
The nature of the market structure implies that the leader can be completely ousted from
the market by the entrant offering a higher quality product. This will happen if the quality
selected by the leader satisfies the following condition:
q1 < c1 + c2(Γ−1) Δ1−ΓΔ2 . (24)
When (24) is satisfied, the optimal quality q2 selected by the follower results in a negative
instantaneous duopoly profit of the leader and, ultimately, in its exit. A closer inspection of
(24) indicates that for a given level of market-specific parameters (captured by β) and the de-
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gree of product differentiation, the leader is more likely to leave under Bertrand competition
than under Cournot.7
Non-monotonicity of quality choice and entry timing in σ and ρ can also be observed.
This non-monotonicity is a result of the switching across the three quality regimes of Firm
2 in the response to the varying model parameters. In particular, when the resulting market
outcome after Firm 2’s entry is a monopoly with Firm 2 having chosen quality strategi-
cally (FMAk = MS), the quality selected by Firm 1 exceed that corresponding to a duopoly
(FMAk = D). By increasing quality Firm 1 simply delays the entry of its competitor, who
is going to capture the entire market. On the other hand, when the resulting outcome is
monopoly with Firm 2 selecting the first-best (monopolistic) quality level, there is no scope
for Firm 1 to increase quality – Firm 2 does not have to engage in quality competition as it
induces the exit of Firm 1 by just choosing the (low) monopolistic quality level.
The direct effect of the degree of product differentiation on the chosen quality levels and
the optimal timing of entry is not so clear-cut. However, product differentiation has a fun-
damental role in determining the market structure after the entry of the follower (Firm 2).
As high ρ leads generally more often to monopolistic outcomes, it makes the quality choices
and entry thresholds more extreme. In particular, those quality levels and investment thresh-
olds are expected to be higher if the monopoly is triggered by the strategic quality choice of
Firm 2 FMAk = MS) and lower if Firm 2 can afford to select the first-best monopolist level
FMAk = M).
Finally, the presence of the first mover advantage is generally associated with a duopolis-
tic outcome following Firm 2’s entry. This result is consistent with Lambertini and Tedeschi
(2007), who also obtain that leader achieves a higher payoff despite supplying the lower
quality good. In our model, the first-mover advantage is completely eroded (and assumes a
7It is easy to show that this condition is always satisfied under Bertrand competition for ρ sufficiently close
to 1. Under Cournot competition, investment cost elasticity ε has to be lower than 8β/(3(β− 1)) for (24) to
always be satisfied for ρ sufficiently close to 1.
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negative value) if the pioneering firm is forced by the new entrant to leave the market.
4 Flexible Quality
In this section the pioneering firm (Firm 1) is assumed to have sufficient know-how that
enables it for a single quality upgrade following the entry of Firm 2. The ability to change
quality could result from, among other factors, Firm 1’s technology being the outcome of its
own R&D process.8
The cost of upgrading quality from q0 to q1, I(q1,q0), is equal to I(q1)− I(q0). In other
words, investing in a given level of quality in two stages is not associated with any additional
costs relative to a single-stage investment.
As in Section 3, the optimal initial quality of Firm 1, q0, is found by maximizing the
value of Firm 1’s investment opportunity ignoring the possibility of the future entry of Firm
2. The entry threat of Firm 2 can be ignored since the quality chosen initially of Firm 1 can
be instantaneously changed following the entry of the competitor and the total cost of the
reaching the new quality level is not path dependent. As a result, the optimal quality of Firm
1 operating in the initially uncontested market is given by
qm = c1Γ. (25)
The cost structure of investment in quality implies that the solution to the original game
following the entry of Firm 1 is equivalent to a simpler game in which i) Firm 2 chooses the
timing on entry, x2, and its quality, q2, and ii) Firm 1 has to respond by immediately entering
with quality q1 or not entering at all. The latter game is solved in three steps: identifying the
reaction function of Firm 1, q1(q2), for an arbitrary level of x2, finding the optimal quality
choice of Firm 2 given the reaction function q1(q2) for an arbitrary x2, and selecting x2 that
8An alternative way of modeling flexible quality choice would be via allowing for marginal increases of
quality. However, the analysis of a differential game arising as a result of such a modeling approach is outside
the scope of this paper.
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maximizes the value of Firm 2’s investment opportunity. The reaction function of Firm 1 is




r−α − I(q1,q0), (26)











Maximization (27) is done numerically as the explicit form of q2(q1) is unknown.
As in previous section, the value of the investment opportunity of Firm 1, F1, consists of
two components. One reflects the present value of the monopolistic profit flow, whereas the
other reflects the value of future revenues lost due to the competitive entry (and, possibly,
Firm 1’s exit).
Table 2 illustrates the effect of the possibility of making the quality adjustment by Firm
1 upon Firm 2’s entry on a the firm’s strategic variables and the magnitude of the first-mover
advantage. As the entry threshold for Firm 1 does not depend on a future competitive entry
and is identical to the monopolistic threshold, only the threshold of Firm 2 is reported in a
conjunction with the qualities supplied by both firms.9
[Please insert Table 2 about here]
One of the most clear findings following from the analysis of Table 2 is the effect of
Firm 1’s flexibility to adjust quality on the resulting market structure.10 For a wide range
of parameters, Firm 2 sets it quality at such a level that makes it unattractive for Firm 1 to
stay in the market (REG = M). Only for a combination of relatively large demand volatility
and highly differentiated products, Firm 1 stays in the market following the entry of Firm
9As the results do not differ significantly between Bertrand and Cournot competition, we only report those
of the latter.
10To maintain the consistency of the concept of ”Firm 1’s flexibility”, its exit is associated here with a
negative quality investment, that is, with incurring cash inflow of I(q 0).
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2. The intuition for the monopoly being the prevailing market outcome following Firm 2’s
entry is as follows. By being effectively the leader in the quality game played at x2, Firm 2
sets quality at such a level that makes exit the optimal strategy for Firm 1. Therefore, this
outcome can be interpreted as a negative value of flexibility in a strategic setting. In fact,
this is the absence of the commitment to the initial quality level that puts Firm 2 is such an
unfavorable strategic position.
A comparison of Tables 1 and 2 leads to the observation that the flexible quality technol-
ogy of Firm 1 generally lowers the optimal quality of Firm 2. As a consequence, the entry
threshold of Firm 2 becomes lower as well. Again, higher uncertainty is associated with a
higher quality provision.
Contrary to the fixed quality case, the value of Firm 1’s investment opportunity is lower
than the one of Firm 2 for a wide range of parameter values (cf. FMA in Table 2). This
finding contradicts Aoki and Prusa (1996) and Pennings (2004), where a higher value of the
leader is obtained. However, in those contributions the follower does not have a strategic
advantage of effectively being the first-mover in the quality setting game. Upon inspecting
Table 2 we conclude that the first-mover advantage of Firm 1 can prevail only in two situ-
ations. First, the value of the leader can be higher if demand volatility is low and the entry
of Firm 2 leading to Firm 1’s exit – remote (in the discounted probability-weighted terms).
Second, for relatively highly differentiated products, Firm 1 can enjoy both the the earlier
arrival of the revenue stream and the market presence also following the entry of Firm 2.
To summarize, the relative value of being the leader is generally much lower when quality
is flexible rather than fixed. Such an outcome results from the fact that Firm’s 1 flexible
quality choice is associated with its inability to commit to the initial quality level when
confronted with the entry of Firm 2.
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5 Conclusions
Extending the strategic quality choice literature by allowing for dynamics and uncertainty
leads to a number of interesting results. First, we study a duopoly game where both firms can
once make a fixed quality choice. We show that the quality chosen by the leader is generally
higher than in the monopolistic case for low levels of uncertainty and lower when the demand
level is less predictable. Moreover, higher uncertainty generally widens the wedge between
the firms’ qualities and raises the time interval elapsing between their entries. Furthermore,
the first-mover advantage exists as long as a duopoly is a resulting market outcome follow-
ing the second mover’s entry. However, we show that for certain configurations of market
parameters the entrant finds it optimal to set quality strategically to induce the exit of the
pioneering firm. It is also possible that the first-best monopolistic quality level of the entrant
results in the leader’s exit. In such cases the first-mover advantage is unlikely to prevail.
Second, we modify the game to allow the first firm to change its quality following the
entry of the second mover. By being effectively the leader in the new quality game played
at the point of its entry, the second mover sets in most scenarios its quality at a level that
induces the leader’s exit. It is the inability of the leader to commit to the initial quality
level that allows Firm 2 to obtain the strategic advantage. A comparison of firms’ values
under two alternative technologies leads to conclusion that the relative value of the leader
is generally much lower when the quality of the pioneering firm is flexible. Moreover, the
flexible quality of the first mover has implications for the average quality provision. As the
follower generally invests in such a case sooner, its marginal return of quality is lower, so
very high quality levels are unlikely to occur.
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A Proofs of Propositions
Proof of Proposition 1. The proof is straightforward and follows from the definition
of the instantaneous profit function of Firm 1 (cf. equation (4)). In regimes q1 < q′1 and
q1 ≥ q′′1 Firm 2 chooses its quality response by solving the first-order condition of the value
maximization problem (11). For q1 ∈ [q′1,q′′1) Firm 1 would find it optimal to stay in the
market if Firm 2 chose its (unconstrained) monopolistic quality level. However, Firm 2 is
better off by setting a second-best quality level that triggers Firm 1’s exit than by selecting
the first-best duopolistic quality level. As a result, for q1 ∈ [q′1,q′′1) the monopoly of Firm 2
results.
Proof of Proposition 2. The sign of derivative dq∗2/dq1 immediately follows from (13)












The positive sign of ∂x∗2/∂q1 and dq∗2/dq1 follows directly from the relevant definitions. The


























(β−1)ε−2β > 0. (A.4)
For intermediate regime (that is, for q1 ∈ [q′1,q′′1)), the inequality holds as well. This can be
shown by observing that the positive sign of derivative (A.3) for q∗2 under regime q1 < q′1
implies a positive sign for q∗2 under regime q1 ∈ [q′1,q′′1), as under the latter q∗2 is greater and
(A.3) has a unique root.
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B Derivation of Firm 2’s value using dynamic program-
ming
The basic problem is to find the optimal timing of entry, given that the consumer mass, which
drives the instantaneous revenue from the project, follows a geometric Brownian motion
(GBM):
dxt = αxt +σxtdwt . (B.1)
First, we determine the value of the firm after its entry, V2. Since the immediate payoffs to
the owner of the firm equals its instantaneous profit, π2, the corresponding Bellman equation
can be written as
rV2dt = E [dV2 (x)]+π2(q2,q1)xdt. (B.2)
Equation (B.2) means that for a risk-neutral firm, the expected rate of change in its value over
the time interval dt plus immediate payoffs equals the riskless rate. Applying Itoˆ’s lemma
to the RHS of (B.2), and dividing both sides of the equation by dt results in the following









The general solution to (B.3) has the following form:
V2 (x) = A1xβ+A2xλ+
π2(q2,q1)x
r−α , (B.4)

















Moreover, it holds that β > 1 and λ < 0. In order to find the value of Firm 2, V2 (x), the





V2 (0) = 0. (B.7)
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Conditions (B.6) and (B.7) implies that A1 =A2 = 0, which is associated with no optionalities
held by Firm 2 after entry.
The value of Firm 2’s investment opportunity satisfies a differential equation similar to
(B.3). Since the opportunity is associated with no immediate payoffs, the corresponding
equation does not include the non-homogenous part. Therefore, its general solution is
F2 (x) = AF1xβ+AF2xλ, (B.8)
where AF1 and AF2 are constants. In order to find the value of the investment opportunity,
F2 (x), and the entry threshold, x∗2, the following boundary conditions are applied to (B.8):
F2 (x∗2) = V2 (x∗2)− I(q2), (B.9)
F ′2 (x
∗
2) = V ′2 (x∗2)− I′(q2), (B.10)
F2 (0) = 0. (B.11)
Conditions (B.9) and (B.10) are called the value-matching and the smooth-pasting condi-
tions, respectively, and ensure continuity and differentiability of the value function at the
investment threshold. Condition (B.11) ensures that the investment option is worthless at the
absorbing barrier x = 0. Consequently, it implies that AF2 = 0. Substitution of (B.8) into
(B.9)–(B.11) and some algebraic manipulation yield the value of the optimal entry threshold
(10) and the value of investment opportunity (11).
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Figure 1: Quality choice of Firm 2, q2, as the function of the quality selected by Firm 1,
q1 ∈ (c1,∞). For q1 < q′1, Firm 2 optimally selects the monopolistic quality, at which Firm
1 leaves the market. For q1 ∈ [q′1,q′′1), Firm 1 selects quality strategically to induce Firm 1’s



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Effect of Quality Adjustment of Firm 1 on Quality Choices and Timing of Entry
σ ρ q1 q2 x2 FMA REG
0.1 – 1.063 0.109 -0.274 M
0.05 0.5 – 1.188 0.141 1.384 M
0.9 – 1.249 0.172 4.952 M
0.1 – 1.156 0.148 -0.287 M
0.15 0.5 – 1.227 0.184 -0.881 M
0.9 – 1.613 0.322 -0.754 M
0.1 3.882 3.817 3.438 0.121 D
0.25 0.5 – 3.641 2.750 -0.996 M
0.9 – 3.679 2.931 -1.000 M
Table 2: Comparative statics results concerning debt choice policies, qi, optimal timing of
entry of the follower, x2, the degree of the firm mover advantage, FMA, and market regimes
following Firm 2’s entry, REG, for different levels of the volatility of consumer mass, σ, and
product (horizontal) differentiation, ρ. The leader’s quality is adjustable upon the follower’s
entry. Remaining parameter values are: c1 = c2 = 0.5, θ= 0, ε = 5, r = 0.05, α = 0.0 and
I0 = 0.1. FMA is defined as F1/F2−1. D denotes duopoly, M – monopoly (with the first-best
quality level of Firm 2).
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